[North-NV-Greens] Fwd: FOIA Request Update from BlackBoxVoting.org

[Paul Etxeberri]

>
>Dear 9/11 truth activists and concerned citizens,
>
>The following is the most recent update from Bev Harris' organization in
>Seattle -- BlackBoxVoting.Org. BlackBoxVoting.Org is has submitted the
>largest Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in history, asking for
>the computer logs from over 3,000 voting machines around the country.
>
>We at the 9/11 Visibility Project believe the evidence for electronic
>voting fraud in the 2004 election is more than compelling, and we will
>continue to send you periodic updates as the issue develops.
>
>Let the truth come out!
>
>Emanuel Sferios
>Webmaster, 9/11 Visibility Project
>http://www.septembereleventh.org
>-----
>
>>From Bev Harris:
>
>Freedom of Information requests at http://www.blackboxvoting.org have
>unearthed two Ciber certification reports indicating that security and
>tamperability was NOT TESTED and that several state elections directors, a
>secretary of state, and Dr. Britain Williams signed off on the report
>anyway, certifying it.
>
>The documents, posted at Black Box Voting (.ORG) show that Ciber Labs'
>Shawn Southworth used a conformance chart specifying FEC regulations,
>marking each test item "pass" or "fail."
>
>Southworth “tested” whether every candidate on the ballot has a name. But
>we were shocked to find out that, when asked the most important question
>-- about vulnerable entry points -- Southworth’s report says “not
>reviewed.”
>
>Ciber “tested” whether the manual gives a description of the voting
>system. But when asked to identify methods of attack (which we think the
>American voter would consider pretty important), the top-secret report
>says “not applicable.”
>
>Ciber “tested” whether ballots comply with local regulations, but when we
>asked Shawn Southworth what he thinks about Diebold tabulators accepting
>large numbers of “minus” votes, he said he didn’t mention that in his
>report because “the vendors don’t like him to put anything negative” in
>his report. After all, he said, he is paid by the vendors.
>
>Was this just a one-time oversight?
>
>Nope. It appears to be more like a habit. We also posted the sister
>report, for another vendor entirely, VoteHere, and you can see that the
>critical security test, the “penetration analysis” was again marked “not
>applicable” and was not done.
>
>Maybe another ITA did the penetration analysis?
>
>Apparently not. We discovered an even more bizarre Wyle Laboratories
>report. In it, the lab admits the Sequoia voting system has problems, but
>says that since they were not corrected earlier, Sequoia could continue
>with the same flaws. At one point the Wyle report omits its testing
>altogether, hoping the vendor will do the test.
>
>Computer Guys: Be your own ITA certifier.
>
>Black Box Voting has posted a full Ciber report on GEMS 1.18.15. We also
>posted a .zip file download for the GEMS 1.18.15 program. We also provided
>a real live Diebold vote database. Compare your findings against the
>official testing lab and see if you agree with what Ciber says. E-mail us
>your findings.
>
>Who the heck is NASED?
>
>They are the people who certified this stuff. Now, if the security of the
>U.S. electoral system depends on you to certify a voting system, and you
>get a report that says security was “not tested” and “not applicable” --
>what would you do?
>
>Perhaps we should ask them. Go ahead. Hold them accountable for the
>election we just had. (Please, e-mail us their answers) Their names are
>listed on the Web site.
>
>Bev Harris
>
>
>__________________________________


-- 
Paul Etxeberri

"Forests precede civilizations and deserts follow"   ---Chateaubriand